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A tw o-stage gam e is stud ied  in which firm s choose th e ir  techno­
logy in th e  first stage  and  set quan tities in th e  second. T he choice 
is betw een high fixed/low  m arg inal and low fixed /h igher m arg inal 
costs. W hen q u an tities  are chosen non-cooperatively , an increase 
in th e  num ber of firm s in the  m arket can lead to  h igher equilibrium  
profits for all firm types. If, in s tead , firm s collude in the  second 
stage they  will ten d  to  prefer technologies w ith  higher fixed costs 
and  subsequently  lower m arg inal costs. T he  effect of an increase in 
com petition  on th e  colluding firm s depends critically  on th is  fixed 
cost and  th e  co rresponding  equilibrium  m arket s tru c tu re .






















































































































































































This paper describes a simple model of duopoly and oligopoly with specific 
functional forms when firms face a choice of which technology to adopt. 
In this respect it differs from much of the existing literature on cost diffe­
rences when firms’ technologies (especially when asymmetric) are assumed 
to be exogenously determined. The choice of technology often leads to dif­
ferentiated cost structures when firms compete for market shares. Given 
the possibility of different costs. I discuss the consequences of changes in 
the technologies, demand parameters and the level of competition on the 
firms’ strategies and pay-offs. The analysis proceeds by using a two-stage 
game where firms first decide which cost structure (technology) to employ 
and then choose quantities, cither using Cournot conjectures or collusivcly. 
Examples are used to highlight the results where useful and an examina­
tion is provided of the effects of changes in the exogenous parameters on 
the equilibrium outcomes.
One result of the paper is the potentially ambiguous effect of an in­
crease in competition on the equilibrium pay-offs (profits). I demonstrate 
how an increase in the number of firms can cause a change in the choice 
of technologies employed which itself leads to higher profits for all firm 
types. When firms collude in the second stage, they arc subject to the 
same form of commitment problem as colluding firms who over-invest in 
capacity1. If the fixed cost of obtaining lower marginal costs is itself low. 
this leads to an over-investment in the low marginal cost technology and 
smaller profits.
I start by describing the model for the duopoly case in functional 
form2 and then demonstrate (using numerical examples) the results and
1See Phlips [5] for references to this literature.
2 An analysis of two-stage duopoly games with general forms is given by Shapiro [8] 
who discusses conditions for uniqueness and existence as well as the differrent effects 
th a t the cost structures have on the rivals' behaviour. For references to  other articles 



























































































potentially ambiguous outcomes that arc possible when cost differences 
occur in an oligopoly. Thus by highlighting the conditions and results of 
endogenous technologies within a two-stage (non-cooperative and coope­
rative) game. I provide a different perspective to the existing literature.
2 M odel
The market consists of firms with two possible cost structures called r and 
b where r denotes the cost structure with higher marginal, but lower fixed 
costs and b the reverse. Costs are defined by
Ci = Fi+Ciqi i = 1.....n
for qi > 0. C; > 0 and Ft > 0. To simplify matters I assume that type c's 
fixed cost is normalised to 0 and therefore drop the subscript on F. We 
arc then left with potential costs as follows3
Cfc F -1- C),qb  ̂j j
C,. =  c,qv
where ct < cv.
One simple interpretation of the different cost structures is as follows. 
Each firm has a choice of whether to employ a technology with a high 
capital cost outlay but then low labour and maintenance costs thereafter 
(type 6) or to use a less capital intensive technology which requires more 
labour and therefore relatively higher marginal costs (type v). Clearly 
there can be other interpretations of the model.
The demand side of the industry is given by the inverse demand 
function
_  f q -  ;3Q for  0 < Q < f 
P (  0 for Q >  |
3 This appears to imply th a t type v has constant returns to  scale whilst type b has 
increasing returns to  scale. This norm alisation is for convinience and the results hold 




























































































where p is market price. Q is total industry output. To simplify the algebra 
I normalise 0 =  1 so that p =  a — Q.
The model is a two stage game as follows
1. Strategic Game: in the first stage the firms decide which cost struc­
ture to use, c =  (c1; c2, ..., cn), C; =  {c„,C(,} i — 1,2, c is the 
vector of all firms strategies while ct is each individual firms strategy.
2. Quantity Game: in the second stage, given the number of firms 
and their respective cost structures, output is chosen as a Cournot
quantity setting game, q = {qi.q2.....<?„}. qi € [0. o -p -Q _ ,] i =
1...., n. where Q_, denotes the industry output excluding firm i.
3 D uopoly Equilibrium
To determine the overall equilibrium in the model I use the sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium concept where equilibrium is required in both 
stages to constitute an overall equilibrium in the game. Therefore I solve 
the model backwards starting with the quantity game in which there is a 
tuple {q, 7r}; representing the strategy and payoff to each firm, followed by 
the strategic game which has its strategy' choice as c, 6 {c„,C(,} i — 1,2.
3.1 Q u a n tity  G am e
Given the two-firm structure, there arc three possible interactions between 
the firms; (i) both firms arc of type v. (ii) both firms are of ty'pe b. and 































































































S tructure Q uantity Profit
i .j  = v <7. = ^
f “ 
0IItT
i , j  = b Qb = ^ r L -, _  (a-Q.)- p hb 9 *
i  =  V
j  = b
~ _  ar-2c„+Ci, t/t; — 3
n  __ a - 2 c b+cvHb — 3
„ (a —2c„+Cf>)-'«1. — 9 ^
- ,  _  ( a - 2 c h+cv f  p 
77 à ~  9 r
where the subscripts represent the firm types. The equilibrium strategies 
in Table 1 arc the intersection points of the two firms reaction functions. 
Note that in addition to the restrictions in (2). for both firms to produce 
positive outputs in the third case requires that
a  — 2c, + Cj > 0 i = v. b i ^  j.
However, given that c„ > cb by definition, this reduces to « > 2c, — cb.
3.2 S tra teg ic  G am e
To determine what will be the optimal choice of the firms in the strategic 
game requires comparing the different pay-offs available which are depicted 
in the strategic game form in Table 2.
TABLE 2




v Jrj,.-**, Trlb-Trlk 
b 77lb-77bb
where the subscripts represent the strategics of firm 1 and 2 respectively 
i.c. 7Tjt, means the profit to firm 1 when 1 has cost structure b and 2 has 
cost structure v. The firms having solved the game backwards will know 




























































































Because of the symmetry4 in decision-making we can examine the choice 
facing firm 1. Given firm 2 plays V it must evaluate jrJ„ -  7rlv and the 
same when firm 2 plays b, 7r4t — 7Tj6 to determine its best strategy. These 
comparisons result in
~ > 0 as A • (a -  cfc) < |F  (3)
‘Kl b - ' * b b >  0 as A ■ (<* — c„) < |F  (4)
where A = c„ — cj. These conditions determine the possible equilibria in 
the strategic stage. For example, if the LHS of both conditions (3) and (4) 
are positive, the unique Nash equilibrium will be for both firms to have 
cost structure v, whereas if neither conditions are met. the unique Nash 
equilibrium is for both to choose b. Should only one hold, we will have the 
situation where there are two possible equilibria where one firm is of type 
v and the other of type b. This is the common problem when there arc 
multiple equilibria and there is no way of telling which would be chosen 
were the game to be played5.
Examining the strategies c = (c„. cv) as a possible equilibrium we can 
sec from the conditions that the larger arc the cost differences between 
types or the larger is the demand intercept, the less likely it is that the 
conditions will hold and therefore the firms will want to both have cost 
structure b (the one with lower marginal costs).
3.3 D u o p o ly  E xam p le
To aid exposition and to demonstrate the possible outcomes we can ex­
amine a simple numerical example. Inverse demand is given by p = 10 — Q. 
Costs arc
Cb — 2 + 2 </;,
C„ =  2.5<7„
Given these costs the payoff matrix will be
4 Dv sym metry I mean that ~lv =  jr^t .
' Due to the sym metry we cannot even resort to Pareto dominance or another similar 






























































































v 625,6J25 6.03.5.44 
b 5.44.64)3 5.11.5.11
hence the overall equilibrium is for both firms to choose cost structure r6.
If we change the numbers slightly by increasing the marginal costs 
of type v from 2.5 to 2.7 (and therefore increasing A) we see that neither 




v 5.92.5.92 4.84.6.41 
b 6.41.4.84 5.11.5.11
with the unique Nash equilibrium being c — {cb. cb ) as might have been ex­
pected as we raised type r's marginal cost. Lastly taking type r ’s marginal 
costs to be the intermediate value of 2.6 we have two possible Nash equi­





v 6.08.6.08 5.14.6.22 
b 6J12.5JJ 5.11.5.11
4 Oligopoly
In this section I examine the situation when there are n-firms in the mar­
ket operating under similar conditions as before. The main differences
61 have underlined the best response of each firm given the other firms strategy is 




























































































between the n-firm oligopoly and duopoly arc that industry output is now 
given by
k n
Q = E ? '+  E  ^
i=l j=k+1
where n is the number of firms in the market, k is the number of firms 
with cost structure v and (n — k) firms with cost structure b.
4.1 Q u a n tity  G am e
Given the above we can see that the industry is characterised by a com­
bination of the two firm types (for example. 4-firms: 1 of type r  and 3 
of type b) in n + 1 possible combinations. For four firms this implies the 
following possible combinations of quantities and profits.
TABLE 3
Example of 4-firm Oligopoly
















P rofit ]b 0̂4 1̂3
etc. *40
There is a certain amount of symmetry involved as we restrict the 
different cost structures to only two types. This implies that when there 
arc 3 firms with type v and 1 with type b. the three type-r firms are 
identical.
Each firm selects its output using the profit maximisation process as 
before although now it is faced by (n — 1) other firms. We can examine 
this for the case of one firm i. Firstly note that the two boundary cases 



































































































The situation for an interior solution has the firm maximise profits 
considering all possibilities. Its profit function is one of the following"
= (P~ cv)qv = + Y  ?" + Z! _ ?••
*b =  ( p ~  cb)qb =  ~  ^  +  £  +  Ç  96j  -  et j  qb ~ F
depending on its type. The first-order conditions which are the same for 
all firms of the same type
^  =  0 = a -  2qi -  (A -  1)?,— (n -  A) qj -  c, i =  1.....k
dx
dqj
i  =  0 = q — 2qj — (n — k — 1) qj — kqi — Cj j  — k + 1.....n.
Solving the n simultaneous first-order conditions leads to the following 
quantity (and subsequent profit) schedules
? . .
Qb
_  a —( n —k + l ) c t +(n-Ar)c<,
7T„ =
(  a  — ( n  — k + l ) c v + ( n  — k)cf, Y
n + l V n + l  )
_  a - ( k + l ) c i , + k c v
irb =
( a - ( k + l ) c k+ k c v \ 2 r
n + l l  n + l  )  t
( 6 )
which constitute a Xash equilibrium, q — (qi,q~i) for the n-firms (of type 
v or b) where A ^  0. We can also note that at the limits (when k —» n or 
A- —► 0) we have the boundary solutions
lira qv = ^k—rn





4.2 S tra teg ic  G am e
Given the possible strategies and pay-offs in the second stage (quantity) 
we can examine the first stage strategics to see if possible equilibria exist
7Note tha t
0 = E*9i + Ei,-*9i 
Q = <h+ Eit-i + E»-k <ij typ*1’




























































































for the game as a whole. To do this I note that the profit for each firm 
can be written as a function of k. the number of firms with cost structure 
v, as 7ti ( k )  i = 1. In effect k  becomes the parameter which can be 
used as the reference point for the equilibrium determination.
TABLE 4
Example Oligopoly Payoff Table
All Firm s (including 1)
Firm  1
k = n k = n -  l  k = n — 2 ... k = 0
v 7r„(n) nv{n — 1) 7rt,(n -  2) ... 
b 7r6( n - l )  T>b(n — 2) ... 7t6(0)
For the strategies (c;,e_;) to be an equilibrium requires that neither 
firm i. nor any of the other firms (—i) would wish to deviate from the 
chosen cost structure. These strategies arc illustrated in Table 4 by the 
different values of k. The corresponding conditions to determine whether 
a particular k is an equilibrium for a given value of n are8
*v(k) > nb( k - l )  (7)
TTb(k) > Ttv(k +1) (8)
for the interior cases. The boundary cases are more straightforward as 
in each case only one condition is required, for example, if all firms have 
cost structure v. for it to be a Xash equilibrium we require that 7r„(n) > 
7T6(n — 1) (i.e. (condition 7)) for all firms.
Substituting from (6) into (7)-(8) to determine the conditions we 
have the following, starting with condition (7)
( «  —(n  —fr+ l)< -„+(n-A r)es )2 ^  ( ( v - fcc ( ,+ (* + l  )c„ )2 r
pT+i? > bin? * ^
A n (-2 ft+ 2c u  +2ct>k - 2 c vk  — ct,n-\-cvn)




An -  (2k -  n )A
(9)
8 These conditions are conceptually equivalent to those of internal and external sta­






























































































( a - { k + l ) c t , + k c v )-
---------- iï----- JT ^  ( o - ( n - < r ) e , , + ( n - < c - l ) c t )-(n+1)-' '  '  (n+1)
An(2Q-2cj,-2ci,Ar+2cvt+Cin-Cvn) - r-
-------------ôthF-------------> F
2(a-c„ ) > B n g l  -  (2k -  n)A
(10)
where A = (c„ — Cf,) as before. (9) and (10) can be combined to give the 
following single condition for a particular industry structure (i.e. a value 
of k) to be a Nash equilibrium
(a -  c„) < r-^ --- -  A(A- -  n/2) < (o -  cb) (11)
where r(n) — By using condition (11) we can test whether a
particular industry structure will be a Cournot-Xash equilibrium for the 
overall game. In addition we can examine (11) to see what effect changes 
in the parameters will have on the equilibrium cost structures adopted by 
the firms.
4.3 A n a ly s is  o f  E q u ilib riu m  C on d ition s
A graphical analysis of the condition is given in Figure 1 which shows 
the two outer constraints (q — c. ) and the middle term as the downward 
sloping curve in A-space9. This is to be interpreted as follows; where the 
point on the curve is above a particular value of k. that value of k is a 
Cournot-Xash equilibrium of the overall game as it satisfies condition (11) 
implying that it is in no firms interest to deviate from its particular cost 
structure.








A2n2 + F (n2 — 1) 
2An2 >  0
( 12)
(13)
which can be interpreted as follows;
9 There is a slight abuse of notation here as k is a  discrete variable and therefore 




























































































• (12) shows that an increase in the fixed cost of type b shifts the A- 
curve upwards implying, cetens paribus, that more firms will be of 
cost structure v in equilibrium. This is not surprising as the benefit 
of having the lower marginal cost is offset by the higher fixed cost.
• (13) is the effect of an increase in competition (the number of firms) 
on possible equilibria. As the increase in competition leads to ne­
cessarily lower market shares for all firms, the benefit of having the 
lower marginal cost associated with the fixed cost decreases which 
leads to higher values of k. Clearly the type b firms need to cover 
their fixed costs before reaping the benefits of the lower marginal 
costs.
• An increase in the demand intercept, a, will shift upwards the outer 
constraints band implying that a lower value of k is more likely in 
equilibrium. This is expected as the larger is the overall market the 
higher will be the benefits from being type b and having the lower 
marginal cost.
4 .4  C o m p etitio n  E ffects
In order to see how an increase in competition affects the industry struc­
ture we can examine the Cournot-Xash equilibria of the overall games to 
see how they change as n, the number of firms increases.
Presented in Table 5 are the unique Xash equilibria for the game 



















































































































We can see from the table that as n increases, profits to both firm 
types do not necessarily decrease as we might expect11. In fact, when n 
goes from 5 to 6. and k* changes from 2 to 4. equilibrium profits increase 
for both firm types. Total industry output and price change marginally 
(±1%) although individual firm profits change by 13% and 17% respec­
tively for types v and b and even though there is one less firm of type b. 
total industry profits have increased.
The example above demonstrates how an increase in competition 
causes the firms in the industry to restructure themselves, in this particu­
lar case the number of type v firms changes from 2 out of 5 to 4 out of G 
leading to an increase in profits for both firm types.
5 Collusive O utcom es
It is interesting to see how the equilibrium conditions and results are af­
fected by the possibility that firms will collude in the second stage of the 
game. This analysis is complementary, and in some respects analogous to 
the literature on semi-collusion12 in RAcD. capacity and investment, alt­
hough extending the results to the case of cost (technology) differences. 
Using the previous methodology I extend the work of Schmalensee [6] by
(i) using a two-stage game in which the choice of technology is made in 
the first stage and then firms collude in the second; (ii) including de­
mand parameters to sec how they affect the outcomes when they change, 
(iii) allowing for several firms of either cost type (rather than a leader and 
follower fringe environment), and (iv) introducing fixed costs into the ana­
lysis. Schmalensee provided a detailed numerical analysis by comparing 
various collusion technologies and solution concepts. He used bargaining 
theory to determine how the colluding firms will select a point on the pro­
fit possibility frontier that will itself have been determined by the collusive 
technology chosen. However, in his paper firms were simply endowed with 
their technology and the low cost firms were always at an advantage as 
there was no fixed cost or minimum output level to consider.
11 This result is robust to  various values for the exogenous param eters.




























































































In this section I assume that the technology choice is made, knowing 
that firms will collude in the second stage. All firms adopt the Propor­
tional Reduction (PR) approach to determining the quantities that each 
will produce in the collusive equilibrium. This requires that firms main­
tain their non-cooperative Cournot market shares with respect to the total 
collusive quantity. In some respects the PR approach will be inefficient 
from the firms' (and a welfare maximiser's) perspectives as all firms will 
produce positive quantities in equilibrium, rather than one firm with cost 
type b producing everything. Had only one firm produced, the joint-profit 
maximising point could have been reached as the economies of scale would 
have been greater, although this would necessary involve side-payments 
which I believe to be unrealistic in many markets13. The PR approach is 
also intuitively in accordance with the credible threat strategy proposed 
by Osborne [3] where firms increase their outputs proportionately (relative 
to their market share) in response to cheating. However one must reco­
gnise that the collusive gains under PR could be substantially less than 
other methods when costs differ greatly and in this respect. PR could lie 
considered the lower-bound to the potential benefits from collusion.
Having chosen the PR technology to determine the profit possibility 
frontier I assume that firms maximise the generalised Nash product to 
locate the exact quantities produced by the firms. In this respect it is as 
if the firms agree on a scaling factor from their non-cooperative Cournot- 
Xash quantities. They effectively say to each other: we will all produce 
Qi =  ri(Ii where i = b, v. superscript c denotes the Cournot quantity and 
r, £ [0.1]. In order to determine q, and r, I maximise the generalised Nash 
product using the number of each firm type as the bargaining power. This 
can be written as
13 A notable exception to the possibility of m aintaining side payments in a cartel 
is in the auction literature when settling-up. as it is known, takes place immediately 
































































































<7, > 0  i = v .b
where s, is each firms Cournot-Xash market share given by 
_  Qci _  Qi _  ,
S' Qc kq'v + (n-k)q'b ' '
Q (without superscript) is the total collusive quantity. jP denotes the col­
lusive profit and the actual profit functions are those discussed in Section 
4.
Unfortunately, as the objective function is non-linear in q, and the 
number of parameters is large (a. cv. cb. F. k. n) it is not possible to obtain 
explicit functions for the quantities (Schmalensee [6] had the same problem 
even though he normalised everything down to the ratio 7? = ~) and I 
therefore give a numerical analysis of the results14. Partial results are 
given in summary form in Table 6 which uses selected values for the cost 
and demand parameters as the number of firms changes.
In order to provide an approximate measure of the cost difference 
between firm types we can examine the Total Cost functions given earlier 
in (1). If we define q* as the output level when total costs are equal 
between firm types, we can determine its value given the cost parameters, 
as follows
Ci,qv -  F + chqb
F
9 =  ----------cv -  cb
Then by setting the costs as cv = 3 and cb = 2. F =  q* and we can use q’ 
as a gauge of the cost difference as well as the fixed cost.
14 The analysis was performed using Mathematica where I maximised the objective 
function subject to the PR  constraints. This lead to several possible solutions for quan­
tities (local m axim a) which I substituted back into the objective function to determine 





























































































Selected Equilibrium Values 
Collusive Cournot
F n k* < 4 IT CS1 k* K IT CSC %ACS
2 3 0 3.33 10.0 8.00 0 2.00 6.00 18.0 106
4 0 2.00 8.00 8.00 1 0.64 1.24 4.36 19.2 140
5 0 1.20 6.00 8.00 2 0.44 0.78 3.22 20.1 151
6 0 0.67 4.00 8.00 4 0.51 0.94 3.92 19.8 147
7 0 0.29 2.00 8.00 5 0.39 0.64 3.23 20.3 153
2.5 3 0 2.83 8.50 8.00 1 1.56 2.56 6.69 16.5 106
4 1 1.56 2.14 7.99 7.64 2 1.00 1.50 5.00 18.0 135
5 2 1.28 1.70 7.67 7.39 4 1.00 1.50 5.50 18.0 143
6 3 1.08 1.40 7.45 7.20 6 1.00 6.00 18.0 150
7 5 1.20 1.55 9.09 6.79 7 0.77 5.36 18.8 176
3 3 2 3.33 4.24 10.9 6.98 3 3.06 9.19 13.8 111
4 4 3.06 12.2 6.12 4 1.96 7.84 15.7 156
5 5 2.45 12.2 6.12 5 1.36 6.81 17.0 177
6 6 2.04 12.2 6.12 6 1.00 6.00 18.0 194
7 7 1.75 12.2 6.12 7 0.77 5.36 18.8 207
%ACS denotes the % change in consumer surplus when comparing the 
collusive and Cournot equilibria and n ' is the total industry profit, i =  t, c.
Table 6 summarises the overall game by showing the profit functions 
determined in the second stage and the equilibrium value of k from the first 
stage. It has several interpretations. One can see that when F is relatively 
low (F = 2), all firms in the collusive equilibrium will be type 6, even 
though their profits arc strictly increasing in k. This result is analogous to 
over-investment in industry capacity in similar two-stage games (Osborne. 
M.J. and C. Pitchik [4] and Phlips [5]) where firms use their investment 
in capacity (choice of production technology) as a pre-commitment to the 
collusive second stage15. Additionally, when the number of firms increases 
(i.e. for n =  6,7, ...), it can be that the firms would earn greater profits
15 In fact one can interpret F  as the cost of installing capacity (although in this 
case it is the appropriate technology) and therefore when it is low and quantities are 




























































































had they been competing in the second stage due to the different industry 
structure which prevails in equilibrium. This situation changes when F 
is high (F = 3) as all firms adopt technology r earning strictly greater 
profits.
When comparing the collusive and Cournot equilibria, we can see 
that the structure of the industry (k*) is more stable as F changes under 
Cournot competition. That is. when firms compete and F increases, the 
equilibrium values of k change more gradually.
When quantities are set cooperatively and for particular values of 
the exogenous parameters, there will be an F when it starts to pay the 
colluding firms to have k* > 0. i.e. a mixture of firm types. This turning 
point is analogous to the cost of installing capacity in that literature when 
the cost is large enough that even though capacity (being type b here) 
acts as a form of commitment, it would be out-of-cquilibrium behaviour 
for firms to install the excess capacity (be of type b).
In the collusive equilibria with high or low costs, consumer surplus 
is the same when the number of firms increases16, because both quanti­
ties and prices remain unchanged. As might be expected under Cournot 
competition, as well as being absolutely higher in all cases, consumer sur­
plus increases as the number of firms increases. Total surplus (not shown) 
depends on the change in industry profits and is closely linked to the ap­
propriate values of k*. When all firms choose technology b in the collusive 
equilibria (low F). industry profits decline rapidly as the number of firms 
increases due to the fixed cost of each additional firm. This will obviously 
cause a decline in total surplus as consumer surplus does not change.
6 Conclusions
Asymmetric oligopoly models allow us to examine the effect of differing 
technologies on economic performance. In a two-stage game using functio­
nal forms. I have examined the conditions required for a particular market 
structure to be an equilibrium when firms firstly choose a technology to




























































































adopt and then compete for market shares. The effects of changes in the 
degree of competition and other parameters were analysed and numeri­
cal analysis demonstrated how an increase in competition can provide the 
right motivation to restructure and potentially increase the firms profits.
When firms collude in the second stage, the analysis shows that too 
many firms may opt for the high fixed/low marginal cost structure in stage 
1 in order to commit themselves for the quantity sharing in the second 
stage. As the number of firms in the industry increases, the negative 
effect of ‘over-investment’ in technology worsens and colluding firms may 
find that the over-investment leads to inferior outcomes than would have 
occurred if they had competed.
Future research could incorporate (i) repeating the second stage of 
the game with suitable discount factors, and (ii) giving the technology a fi­
xed life span (T) and (iii) issues relating to entry, which have been ignored 
in this paper. When combined, (i) and (ii) may lead to a better under­
standing of the duration and frequency of change in both technologies and 
market structures.
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